I’m the Never Ending Pie Throwing Robot, aka NEPTR.

Linux enthusiast, programmer, and privacy advocate. I’m nearly done with an IT Security degree.

TL;DR I am a nerd.

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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: November 20th, 2024

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  • Remote code execution is a concern. Your server and your network as a whole (including other VLANs) are susceptible to attack if Jellyfin is compromised. If Jellyfin is running on the host, it would be trivial to hack your server (and anything else running/connected to it). If Jellyfin is in a Docker/Podman containers, it doesnt prevent attacks against the host (sandbox escape, kernel privilege escalation, etc), or against your network over some ports. Even if the server is on it’s own VLAN, a vulnerability or weakness in your router could still lead to a compromise, meaning that any devices that is in any way connected to your router (including personal devices) could be attacked.

    There is a lot of depth to this topic of course. And at some point you just calculate your risks and weigh your options. There is no such thing as perfect security of course.













  • You can just layer persistent malware (like a .rpm from the internet) using rpm-ostree, or rebase to a malicious image, because rpm-ostree doesnt require a password. Atomic doesnt mean basically anything other than you switch out images, it isnt a security feature. Or have persistent malware by creating a systemd user service that runs on login, or a system service which does the same, and does something malicious (exfiltrate data or keylog [yes that is possible on Wayland with LD_PRELOAD trick]). Or modify the use’rs ~/.bashrc and change the path to include something like /tmp or ~/.local/bin and pit a fake sudo binary which takes president over the real sudo and does something (like steal your user password). Or LD_PRELOAD a malicious binary to everything either by adding a line to the .bashrc, or get root and create /etc/ld.so.preload

    The list goes on. It isn’t more secure than regular Fedora. It isn’t a (significant) security feature. It doesn’t protect against persistent malware which resides in the user home, etc, or goes unnoticed as a layered package. rpm-ostree can be used to install anything without needing a password. It isn’t secure.



  • I was specifically responding to at the end where you say it is “super secure” at the end of your comment. It is not a security focused distro. It isnt even (only) a privacy distro. It is an anonymity distro. Fedora is private, but it doesnt store everything in RAM or route everything through Tor, so it isn’t amnesic or anonymity focused.

    When compared to Whonix (which is Debian based like Tails) or Secureblue (Fedora Atomic based), Tails doesnt do nearly anything to harden its base other than to strictly proxy the network through Tor, run in RAM, and some default apps.